This tabulation represents a snap-shot of Hong Kong-based entities, registered companies, corporate bank accounts, and/or entities used as a facade behind which boiler room operations via adjoined websites take place, identified by the Consortium of Defrauded Victims:
In this article we publish information about recent advanced fee fraud attempts by the boiler room syndicate, in which they pretend to represent law firms and even having proofs that the Defendants (i.e. themselves) have been apprehended in Shanghai, China!
Read more in this article:
In this article we present a social network analysis of Glen Bullard and his recent coming and going appearance. Glen Bullard is verified to be a key boiler room principal behind the frauds victimizing The Consortium of Defrauded Victims:
The Thai-registered company, Eclipse Restaurants Ltd., being part of the grand washing machinery to launder criminal boiler room money into the Thai hospitality sector, has recently disappeared from the Internet. Read more about this and the adjoined Thai-based lawyers providing legal services to the Eclipse Group,:
About 20,000 visitors now share an interest to read this blog. We acknowledge this interest and the encouraging comments made by the Internet community. We find it to be of specific interest that, among the readers, we now have international legal agencies as well as banks reported to have been involved in the monetary transfers arranged by the illegal fraud syndicate operating across Asia and in particular Thailand.
The Consortium of Defrauded Victims (CDV), the founder of this blog site, is consistent with its mission to report about the on-going drama of the Big Boiler-Room Boys in Thailand as long as the Principals continue to fail to initiate a repayment of USD 20 million confirmed stolen from the members of the CDF by a series of
elaborate investment frauds.
In this report we’ll identify the banks involved in the transfer and subsequent laundering of fraudulent proceeds, obtained through various illegal boiler room scams, via a series of receiving and skipping bank accounts.
Our investigation has confirmed that the ‘Principal Fraudsters’ arranged for the transfer of the proceeds of their illegal investment frauds (scams) to be laundered via numerous corporate business banks accounts with recognised International and local Asian Banks. The listing outlined below only includes the top 25
banks and adjoined receiving business accounts, in terms of cash flow volumes, they were created solely to accommodate the payments unlawfully obtained from defrauded investors.
Bank of Commerce (Philippines)
Bank of East Asia (Hong Kong)
Bank of America (USA)
Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd. (Cyprus)
Bank SinoPac (Taiwan)
Bank of Saint Lucia (Saint Lucia)
Cathay United Bank (Taiwan)
Chinatrust Commercial Bank Ltd. (Taiwan)
DBS Bank (Singapore)
Export and Industry Bank (liquidated; Philippines)
First Commercial Bank (Taiwan)
Hang Seng Bank Ltd. (Hong Kong)
HSBC (Hong Kong)
Hua Nan Commercial Bank Ltd. (Taiwan)
International Commercial Bank of China (Taiwan)
Multibank Inc. (Panama)
Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank Ltd. (Taiwan)
Ta Chong Bank Ltd. (Taiwan)
Taipei Fubon Bank (Taiwan),
Taishin International Bank (Taiwan)
Taiwan Business Bank (Taiwan)
The Sun Trust Banks Inc. (USA)
Union Bank (Philippines)
United Overseas Bank Ltd. (Singapore)
A detailed presentation of the Banks involved, including account names and numbers and adjoined inflated and faked investment objects, can be found in a previous article on this blog.
All of the named Banks who provided wire transfers and transaction accounts to the fraud syndicate have reasons to follow this blog as the Consortium of Defrauded Victims find it highly plausible that the Banks have systematically failed to act in accordance with recognised international AML guidelines and in particular
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding regulations.
We have a substantial amount of records showing that company agents in e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore have registered ‘offshore’ companies on behalf of the fraud syndicate en masse. These companies are typically incorporated as limited liability companies with a foreign company director (goal keeper) being allotted an ordinary share value of $1 HK or $1SG dollar, just to meet with the minimum requirements set by the respective Companies Act (not required to take up personal liabilities except up to the nominal value of their shareholdings).
The purposes of the company registrations are to receive legal rights to enter into contracts with landlords, telecommunication companies, etc, to open corporate business bank accounts (intended to be utilised solely as receiving and skipping accounts in the transfer of monies from defrauded victims via illegal boiler-rooms to provide the Principals with substantial finances and to pay the salaries of the boiler-room employees) and to provide a facade of being a credible business entity.
It can further be questioned whether the registered foreign company directors and national company secretaries actually meet with general principals of Director duties
In one particular case, the fraud syndicate registered 18 companies in Hong Kong, in blocks with company registration numbers close to one another, having the same foreign company director registered, based on faked US passport data. All these companies were set up with business bank accounts linked to banks in Hong Kong and Taiwan, purposely used as receiving accounts to transfer and launder money from illegal boiler room operations. Typically, the procedure to register a corporate bank account in e.g. Hong Kong,
requires the filing of a copy of the Hong Kong identity card or passport; residential proof such as utility bills, bank statements, driving license etc.; and former name or alias proof for each of the directors, authorized signatories, principal shareholders and beneficial owners of corporate shareholders. The copies of all
documents submitted must be certified either by a Certified Public Accountant, Company Secretary, Lawyer or Banker.
The reader may reflect upon the following: How is it possible that the fraud syndicate has at such a significant scale been able to set up numerous offshore companies and register corporate bank accounts using fake identities, to defraud the Consortium of Defrauded Victims of USD $20 million, and transfer and receive vast volumes of money from their illegal business operations without arousing the suspicions of the respective Banks AML and compliance divisions and/or the financial regulators!
Finally, we would welcome and indeed encourage the aforementioned Banks to contact the Consortium of Defrauded Victims within the next 14 days to discuss the issues outlined above. Should the banks decline this offer, CFD may decide to embark on further disclosures.